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This  paper  assesses  why  participation  in  markets  for small  ruminants  is  relatively  low  in  northern  Ghana
by analysing  the  technical  and  institutional  constraints  to innovation  in  smallholder  small  ruminant
production  and marketing  in  Lawra  and  Nadowli  Districts.  The  results  show  that  the limitations  experi-
enced  by  smallholders,  i.e.,  water  shortages  during  the  dry season,  high  mortality  and  theft  of  livestock,
persist  because  of institutional  constraints.  These  include  structural  limitations  related  to  availability
of  arable  lands,  weak  support  systems  for  animal  production  and  health  services  delivery,  community
values  that  are  skewed  towards  crop  production  more  than  animal  husbandry,  ineffective  traditional  and
formal structures  for justice  delivery,  and  gaps  in  the  interaction  between  communities  and  district  and
national  level  organizations  such  as the  Ministry  of Food  and  Agriculture,  district  assemblies,  rural  banks,
and  non-governmental  organizations  as well  as  traders  and  butchers.  Confronted  with  such  constraints,
the  strategies  that  most  smallholders  have  adopted  to be resilient  entail  diversiﬁed  sources  of livelihood,
low  input  use  in  small  ruminant  production,  and  maintaining  the  herd  as  a capital  stock  and  insurance.
Only  a few  smallholders  (i.e.,  ‘positive  deviants’)  engage  in  market  or demand-driven  production  or
exhibit successful  strategies  in  small  ruminant  husbandry.  It  is  argued  in this  paper that  for  the  majority
of  smallholders,  market  production,  which  requires  high  levels  of external  inputs  or intensiﬁcation  of
resource  use,  is not  a viable  option.  The  main  implications  of  the  study  are  (1)  that  other  institutional
constraints  than  market  access  constraints  should  be addressed,  (2) that  commercial  livestock  production
should not  be idealized  as  the  best  or only  option  (as  is being  done  in many  contemporary  interventions
that  aim  at  incorporating  smallholders  into  commodity  value  chains),  and  (3)  that different  types  of  small
ruminant  system  innovation  pathways  should  be explored  by  making  use  of local  positive  deviants.
 Roya© 2012
. Introduction
Worldwide, livestock production systems are undergoing rapid
hanges in response to population growth, urbanization and
ncreasing incomes. Developing countries are projected to account
or 85% of the growth in demand for meat products between
995 and 2020 [1].  The increasing demand for animal products is
xpected to improve the incomes and livelihood of smallholders
ho account for the bulk of production in developing countries.
owever, most of the increases in livestock production are tak-ng place outside the smallholder sector [1,2]. This is also the
ase for the production of small ruminants such as goats, because
ost smallholders have a low market participation that will not
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +233 201 409540.
E-mail address: kojo116@yahoo.com (K. Amankwah).
573-5214/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
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easily increase since they invest very little in their management
and suffer from high transaction costs [3,4]. High demand for
livestock products and low direct market participation by small-
holders also describes well the situation in northern Ghana. As
elsewhere [2,3,5],  several interventions with a focus on smallholder
small ruminant commercialization have been made to improve
Ghanaian small ruminant production systems and markets, such as
the National Livestock Services Project (1993–1999) and the Live-
stock Development Project (2003–2009). However, these have not
changed the small ruminant production and marketing systems in
any signiﬁcant way  [6].
Recent studies of agricultural innovation indicate that innova-
tion is not just about adopting new technologies. New technical
practices also call for alternative ways of organizing, for example,
markets, labour, land tenure and the distribution of beneﬁts [7,8].
Different parts of production systems and of the institutional envi-
ronment in which they are embedded (e.g., the value chain, the
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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arket, the policy environment) thus need to evolve simultane-
usly in order to enable innovation, and this requires interactions
mongst multiple actors [9,10,11]. The realization that many actors
nd their activities matter for innovation is the essence of innova-
ion systems thinking. An innovation system can be deﬁned as the
et of all individual and organizational actors that are relevant to
nnovation in a particular sector or issue, their interactions and gov-
rning institutions [12]. Institutions in this perspective are deﬁned
s the rules, standards or principles that co-ordinate interactions
13].
The concept of innovation systems presupposes that they stimu-
ate innovative developments but often they work imperfectly. For
xample, there may  be deﬁcient collaboration amongst actors for
nnovation to occur, due to differences in focus and incentives [14].
urthermore, innovation systems might only support innovations
hat merely sustain dominant practices, instead of enabling radi-
ally different pathways of development [15,16]. Hence, innovation
ystems often do not work as a coherent system in support of inno-
ation, and present ‘innovation system failures’. Klein Woolthuis
t al. [17] have reviewed the commonly occurring types of inno-
ation system failure and on a basis of the typology have designed
 framework for structured analysis of constraints in innovation
rocesses. This framework can be applied to reveal why a certain
esired innovation goal is not achieved [18]. The various constraints
n the innovation system failure framework [17] are structured
ccording to their nature: physical (e.g., roads, farming infrastruc-
ure, technical devices), knowledge (e.g., extension) and service
e.g., banking) infrastructure; hard institutions (by which is meant
he formal rules and regulations that perpetuate an existing regime,
r the lack of them, hampering innovation because the actors are
nsure how legislation will affect their innovation); soft institu-
ions (by which is meant the implicit, unwritten rules, or ‘the way
usiness is done’, which inﬂuences for instance the mind-set for
nnovation or the propensity to collaborate for innovation). The for-
er  also relates to failures concerning interactions amongst actors,
xpressed by too strong networks (sets of powerful actors that
aintain the system status quo in a way that is not conducive to
nnovation) and weak networks (lack of linkages with actors who
an provide new insights, insufﬁcient trust for social learning). The
ramework also encompasses indicators of the actors’ capabilities
or innovating (e.g., education level, time available) [17].
The direct linkage between the technical and institutional
imensions of livestock production systems and the need to
ddress such issues simultaneously has become increasingly rec-
gnized in the livestock innovation literature that applies an
nnovation systems perspective [1,3,9].  Beyond yielding informa-
ion about constraints to innovation in small ruminant production
n northern Ghana, the present paper aims to contribute to the live-
tock innovation systems literature. It deepens innovation system
nalysis by applying a comprehensive and systematic framework
ased on a categorization of so-called innovation system failures
17] to analyse and categorize the coupled technical and institu-
ional constraints.
The overall purpose is to assess why participation in the mar-
et for small ruminants is relatively low in northern Ghana, by
eans of a broad diagnostic study of the institutional and technical
onstraints to innovation of small ruminant livestock production
ystems in Lawra and Nadowli Districts.
. Methodology.1. Selection of the domain
A preliminary exploratory study in the Upper West Region
n northern Ghana identiﬁed a number of strategies thatal of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 37– 47
smallholders employ in response to food insecurity [19]. At a
workshop held in Elmina, Ghana in June 2009, an expert discus-
sion (involving three university lecturers, one PhD student, one
representative of a farmer organization, and two  representatives
of NGOs) about livestock interventions identiﬁed small ruminant
keeping as an essential strategy for coping with food insecurity in
the three northern regions in Ghana [4,6,20]. A follow-up scoping
study showed that a number of development organizations have
ongoing livestock production interventions in all the districts in
Upper West Region—a further indication of the perceived impor-
tance of and opportunities in livestock keeping [21]. The results
of the exploratory and scoping studies and the expert discussion
were used to select small ruminant production and marketing as
an entry point for intervention under the Convergence of Sciences –
Strengthening Innovation Systems (CoS–SIS) Programme in north-
ern Ghana.
2.2. Characteristics of the domain, problem description, and
research questions
Small ruminants (i.e., sheep and goats) are a signiﬁcant source
of livelihood and food security in northern Ghana where almost
all smallholders combine crop production with small ruminant
husbandry. Ghana produces only 30% of the national small rumi-
nant meat demand. Northern Ghana accounts for 70% of the local
production. The remainder is met  by imports from neighbouring
countries to the north, i.e., Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger [6].  The
vegetation of Northern Ghana is mostly Guinea Savannah grass-
land that is conducive to livestock grazing. However, the potential
of livestock for revenue generation, maintenance of soil fertility,
and contribution to household food security in Northern Ghana is
often not realised because of a number of persistent constraints.
This study’s initially sought simply to furnish a descriptive under-
standing of the constraints so that the potential could be realized.
The study was  guided by two  principal questions:
1. What are the prevailing practices of small ruminant produc-
tion and marketing in crop–livestock smallholder households in
Upper West Region of Ghana?
2. What are the farm level and higher level (e.g., value chain, policy
environment, market) constraints of a technical, infrastructural,
institutional, interactional, and capability related nature that
hinder small ruminant innovation, with particular reference to
improved production and market participation by smallholders?
2.3. Study design, population, sampling procedure and data
gathering methods
An explorative and interpretivist qualitative case study design
[22] was  employed. This design is suited to uncovering the mean-
ing that people assign to their experiences. The population of this
study is smallholder crop–livestock farmers in Upper West Region
of Ghana who  experience household food insecurity between one
and ﬁve months in the year [20]. Purposive sampling [23,24] was
used ﬁrst to select the Upper West Region (UWR) out of the three
northern regions and to select Lawra and Nadowli Districts out of
eight districts in UWR, based on the fact that household food inse-
curity was shown in the exploratory and scoping studies [19,21] to
be high in these areas.
Interviews with staff of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture
(MoFA) in Lawra and Nadowli and with other technical experts
at two workshops organized in Wa,  the regional capital, showed
that there are three principal categories of communities in the two
selected districts [21]. In order to capture this diversity, purposive
sampling [23] was then used to select from the three categories of
communities:
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. Communities where smallholders are oriented to trading in live-
stock: of these, Kumasal (1 km from Babile market) in Lawra
District and Tangasie in Nadowli District were selected.
. Communities inclined to livestock production: of these, Tabi-
asi and Dakyiae in Nadowli District were selected (Tabiase was
omitted due to time constraints).
. Communities oriented towards livestock production and that
also have been beneﬁciaries of recent interventions in the sec-
tor. The two selected communities are Oribili and Tankyara near
Nandom (in Lawra District), both of which participated in the
Small Ruminant Improvement Project implemented by the Ani-
mal  Research Institute (ARI) from 2003 to 2009.
Systematic sampling [23] was employed to select 53 com-
ound houses in the ﬁve communities (see Table 5 for number
f households interviewed per community). In most of the cases
he respondent was the male head or landlord of the compound
ouse. Two female landlords and four other females were inter-
iewed in the absence of the male heads. Snowball sampling [23]
lso was employed to identify and interview other individual and
rganizational actors in the supply chain. These actors included
raders, butchers, and food sellers (i.e., ‘chop bar operators’) at the
wo main local markets, i.e., Babile and Tangasie and in the two
argest cities in Ghana, i.e., Accra and Kumasi. Other actors were
he staff of MoFA in the two districts and at national headquarters,
ural banks, district assemblies, non-governmental organizations
NGOs), and police ofﬁcers in the two districts.
The interview schedule included the practices of the diverse
ctors in the small ruminant supply chain, constraints experi-
nced by the actors, and who or what inﬂuenced their activities.
n addition to the interviews, a review of archival documents
see [4,6,25–27])  and participant observation also were employed.
inally, a farmer group in each of the ﬁve communities was invited
o rank the identiﬁed constraints.
After obtaining a broad view of the limitations in small ruminant
roduction systems in the ﬁve communities, the researchers subse-
uently focused on two of the communities for further institutional
nalysis. The criteria used in selecting the two communities
ere participation (Orbili in Lawra District) and non-participation
Tangasie in Nadowli District) in the ARI project and practical con-
iderations such as the distance from Babile (i.e., the residence of
he researchers) to the communities. The respondents to the initial
nterviews indicated that the members of the two  communities
ardly interacted and therefore that the ARI intervention was  not
ikely to have a spill-over effect.
In order to examine the reasons behind the farmers’ priori-
ized constraints at Oribili and Tangasie, one-day multi-stakeholder
orkshops [28] were organized in Lawra and Nadowli Districts,
espectively. The participants included farmers, traders and butch-
rs, staff of MoFA, district assembly, NGOs, rural banks, and the
olice service. The participants were divided into groups during
he workshop, based on the ﬁrst three priority constraints identi-
ed by farmers in the respective community (Table 6). The Research
ssociate, whose role in the CoS–SIS Programme is in part the
acilitation of multi-stakeholder processes, guided the groups to
xamine the reasons for the persistence of the limitations, using
he socio-technical root system analysis tool [29]. In using the root
ystem analysis, each group was assigned a prioritized constraint
dentiﬁed during the community-based interviews. The groups dis-
ussed prevailing practices that contributed to the problem and the
easons why these practices persist. The output of each group’s dis-
ussion was drawn on a ﬂip chart (Fig. 1). The groups presented
n turn their analysis at a plenary session. The limitations identi-
ed were converted to a table conceived as an innovation systems
ailure matrix (Table 7).al of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 37– 47 39
The data in this study were analysed by the researchers man-
ually, using thematic analysis [30]. All the ﬁeld notes were read
and the pages numbered. Each page was  coded manually using the
question ‘what concept is this data an instance of’ so that any asser-
tions to be made could be grounded in the data [22]. Concepts were
identiﬁed and short notes or memos  were written for each concept
on a piece of paper using the data from the corresponding page.
All the pieces of papers that had similar conceptual headings were
pulled together under a higher order term or theme, which was  dis-
covered by means of the similarity between the concepts. Memos
or narrative summaries were then written on the higher order con-
cepts, using the notes under the concepts to illustrate the themes.
To provide readers with a vicarious experience of this process and
in line with the interpretivist philosophy adopted in this paper,
the narrative summary provided in this paper is populated with
direct quotations that illustrate the documented meaning and per-
spectives of the actors in this study [22]. Under the analysis and
discussion section, the various themes are related to each other as
well as to the ﬁndings and the conceptual framework.
3. Results
The results are organised under seven themes: (1) the
crop–livestock farming systems; (2) reasons for keeping small
ruminants; (3) tethering practices; (4) free-range management
practices; (5) the market off-take of small ruminants; (6) the
constraints experienced by smallholders in small ruminant produc-
tion; and, (7) the institutional underpinnings of the constraints.
3.1. Overview of crop–livestock farming systems
The population, households and their sizes in the ﬁve commu-
nities studied are described in Table 1.
All the inhabitants in our sample have diverse sources of liveli-
hood; for instance, all eleven households interviewed at Tangasie in
March 2011 engage both in crop production (during the main sea-
son from May  to November) and livestock keeping. Six out of the
eleven engage in dry season gardening (from December to April);
and six out of the eleven also conduct small-scale trading activities
(such as buying and selling livestock, selling provisions laid out on
tables at weekly markets). Similarly, at Orbili, all nine households
interviewed undertake both crop and livestock production; six out
of the nine engage in dry season gardening; and ﬁve out of the
nine engage in trading activities (in this paper most of the concrete
examples are drawn from these two  communities, where detailed
follow-up interviews were conducted).
Various kinds of crops and animals are raised, as shown for
Tangasie and Orbili in Tables 2 and 3. The farming systems charac-
teristically combine mixed cropping and mixed farming. The most
common farming systems are the millet/sorghum based farming
system, groundnut based farming system, cowpea based farming
system, and maize based farming system. In terms of farm struc-
ture there are two kinds of farms: compound farms (farms built
around the main residence), and bush farms (farms distant from
the main residence). The distance from the place of residence to the
bush farms typically is about 5 km.  Farm sizes range from 0.4 ha to
1.6 ha. Uncropped or marginal lands near the residences are where
animals are tethered for grazing during the rainy season.
The smallholders in the ﬁve communities studied keep sev-
eral kinds of livestock and poultry, namely, sheep and goats (i.e.,
small ruminants), pigs, cattle, donkeys, guinea fowls, chickens and
turkeys. The average herd or ﬂock sizes for the ﬁve major kinds of
animals and birds were found to be: small ruminants 20.2; chickens
14.9; pigs 5.3; guinea fowls 4.8; and cattle 1.9. The percentage of
40 K. Amankwah et al. / NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 37– 47
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Fig. 1. Causal diagram for high mortality of small ruminants.
Table 1
Population, households (hh) and average household size in ﬁve selected communities.
District Community Population (n/community) Households (n/community) Household size (n/hh)
Lawra Kumasal 381 66 5.8
Orbili 256 30 8.5
Tankyara 272 44 6.2
Nadowli Dakyiae 219 37 8.1
Tangasie 1009 154 6.4
Source: Ref. [31].
Table 2
Percentage of households cultivating various crops at Tangasie and Orbili during the 2010 cropping season.
Community Maize Sorghum Millet Groundnut Cowpea Bambara groundnut Rice Yam
Tangasie (n = 11) 82 73 9 82 58 (18 intercropped
cowpea and sorghum)
46 (22 intercropped cowpea
and bambara groundnut with
groundnut)
18 46
Orbili  (n = 9) 100 78 100 100 11 11 11 11
Table 3
Percentage of households keeping various livestock at Tangasie and Orbili in March 2011.
Community Goats Sheep Chicken Guinea fowls Cattle Pigs
Tangasie a 100 30 64 27 9 46
Orbili b 56 89 78 11 33 67
a n = 11 (selected by stratiﬁed sampling with wealth as criterion).
b n = 9 (selected by stratiﬁed sampling with wealth as criterion).
K. Amankwah et al. / NJAS - Wageningen Journ
Table  4
Average herd size of small ruminants per household in 2009 in ﬁve communities in
Lawra and Nadowli Districts.
Community Orbili Tankyara Kumasal Tangasie Dakyiae
Herd size (n/household) 43.7 21.8 9.1 17.5 12.5
Standard deviation 31.0 7.7 3.9 15.3 5.8
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which they have won  a national award. Tankyara is also the onlyource: Field interviews 2010.
ouseholds keeping various livestock and poultry at Tangasie and
rbili is shown in Table 3.
Six out of the seven smallholders interviewed in one of the
ommunities, Dakyiae, preferred to raise small ruminants to other
ivestock because small ruminants do not require much investment
ut are proliﬁc and can be relied on in times of need. One farmer
aptured the sentiment of his fellows when he said: The goat is easy
o keep. It does not require much labour. For instance, you don’t buy
rass or leaves; the animals can fend for themselves.  An animal pro-
uction ofﬁcer in MoFA Tamale explained this preference in these
erms: Farmers don’t want to put in any money. At best they give only
ater. At the end of it, they can get something and still feel comfort-
ble. They don’t invest in it because they pay more attention to crops.
t appears that one of the main attractions of small ruminants is
heir low input requirement.
Most of the farmers keep local West African Dwarf sheep and
oats, which are hardy, disease resistant and proliﬁc. The average
erd size of small ruminants per household for each of the ﬁve
ommunities in 2009 is shown in Table 4.
The average herd size per compound house, for northern Ghana
s a whole, ranges from eight to twelve small ruminants [25]. Herd
izes of approximately 44 and 22 were observed at Oribili and
ankyara, respectively. These are the two communities that were
eneﬁciaries of the ARI project interventions from 2003 to 2009.
he District Directorate of MoFA has reported that small rumi-
ant numbers doubled under the ARI intervention: from 453 at
ribili and 476 at Tankyara in 2005 to 1076 and 972, respectively,
n 2008 [26].
.2. Reasons for keeping small ruminants
Small ruminants are kept for multiple purposes, including stock
f capital, insurance, and for meat to celebrate religious festivals.
owever, the principal purpose is that smallholders rely on their
erd during ‘critical times’. Our respondents recognize three critical
eriods. First, the occurrence of household food shortages. A farmer
t Kumasal said: When I run short of food, I sell [a goat] and use it
the money]. A lecturer in animal production explained that farmers
eep small ruminants to ﬁll the food security gap when the household
uns short of food. They ﬁll a gap rather than [being kept] as a business.
n orientation such that we are going to go beyond this purpose, that is
ot there. Second, the period related to the cost of farm labour and
ther inputs. A farmer at Kumasal conceded: I can’t farm without
aving goats. I can sell one to prepare pito (locally brewed alcohol)
or the labour gang. A trader at Babile Market observed: Farmers
o sell at this time (June–August) for money for ploughing, seeds and
ertilizer. When they harvest and they have food, they don’t have any
roblem again. So they are compelled to keep the animals for the next
eason. Unforeseen circumstances, such as a drought or a funeral,
onstitute the third type of crisis that prompts farmers to rely on
mall ruminants. As a farmer at Orbili said: During farming when
here is drought, we sell [small ruminants] to get income.  A farmer
t Dakyiae summed the reasons succinctly, as follows: The main
urpose of keeping small ruminants is that they are a source of income
n hardship.al of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 37– 47 41
3.3. Tethering during the rainy season
Two  distinct husbandry practices are used: tethering, and leav-
ing the sheep and goats to range freely. These are associated with
the seasons: tethering in the rainy season, from May  to October, and
free-range management in the dry season, from November to April.
During the cropping season, which begins in May, small ruminants
are tethered, i.e., tied with ropes to a stake placed on uncultivated
ﬁelds or communal lands, where they graze the sparse vegetation
during the day, in order to prevent the animals from grazing on the
growing crops. Around noon, most smallholders provide water to
the tethered animals. In the evenings the animals are brought back
into the house compound or penned for the night. This routine is
repeated throughout the cropping season. The main labour input
in small ruminant keeping relates to the tethering and watering
tasks; these tasks are carried out mainly by women and children.
One of the consequences of tethering is that animals lose weight
and become emaciated due to the restricted movement and feed-
ing. Little or no breeding occurs for the duration of the tethering
period. The animals that do fall pregnant record high rates of abor-
tion and post-partum kid mortality. The wet conditions suit the
growth of pathogens and this is the time when the disease inci-
dence of small ruminants is high. Only a few farmers have adopted
alternative strategies to mitigate the negative effects of tethering.
Two strategies were observed. One is the provision of supplemen-
tary feeding of cultivated leguminous fodder crops. For example,
one farmer at Orbili nine years ago had planted half an acre of Sty-
losanthes hamata, a perennial leguminous fodder crop, and he and
his neighbours tethered their animals in this ﬁeld. Another farmer,
at Tangasie, had planted Leucaena leucocephala as live fence around
his backyard garden and he cut this for his ﬂock. The second strat-
egy we  observed is shepherding if the ﬂock size is large (i.e., over
80 sheep), a task carried out by the elderly household members.
Two men, each over 60 years, were observed shepherding their
sheep at Orbili. The men  explained that the children had to go to
school and that the young men  – who were endowed with more
strength – had to work at the farm and thus the responsibility for
herd management was shifted to the relatively weaker elderly men.
3.4. Free-range management during the dry season
The tethering period ends after the harvesting of the ﬁeld crops
in October. During the dry season the animals are released to roam
on their own. Most smallholders also do not ensure that their ani-
mals are housed in the evenings. Uncontrolled breeding occurs
during the free-range period. However, crossbreeds of the local
West African Dwarf Sheep (or Djallonke) and the long-legged Sahe-
lian type were maintained in one out of the ﬁve communities (i.e.,
Tankyara). These crossbreeds are the visible outcome of a small
ruminant improvement initiative in the Upper West Region that
formed part of a project supported by the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) from 1996 to 2004 [27]. The six
breeding stations in the country formerly focused on the introduc-
tion of exotics but during 1992–1993 their breeding policy changed
to the improvement of native breeds in order to meet concerns
about the loss of valuable genetic traits in the local breeds.
In four out of the ﬁve communities bush burning is a common
practice even though it leads to loss of biomass for feeding small
ruminants during the dry season [4].
Tankyara, where there is a still functioning co-operative (that
was started in 1976) is the only community where the farmers have
succeeded in implementing measures to prevent bush burning, forcommunity where the farmers practise storage of farm by-products
such as groundnut vines for supplementary feeding of small rumi-
nants during the dry season. They store the vines on wooden planks
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Table  5
Comparison of households in ﬁve communities by type of sale of small ruminants in 2009.
Name of community No. of households
in  community
No. of households
interviewed
No. of households
selling animals
No. of households
making distress
sales
No. of households
making
demand-driven
sales
No. of households
making
demand-driven sales
as a % of households
selling animals (%)
Orbili 30 10 10 8 2 20.0
Tankyara 44 11 7 4 3 42.9
Kumasal 66 10 5 4 1 20.0
Tangasie 154 10 3 3 0 0.0
Dakyiae 37 12 8 4 4 50.0
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nder the shade of trees. They also gather, dry and store the fruits
f Faidherbia albida trees (known in the local language as Goozie),
hich is adapted to dry conditions, and use these also as fodder.
hen queried about these practices, which are unique to Tanyara,
he farmers responded that the training by and encouragement
rom the co-operative society accounted for the difference between
heir practices and those of others.
In the other four communities most of the smallholders did not
ake any serious provision for supplementary feeding. The only
orm of supplementary feeding observed at Tangasie for instance
as the leaves that some farmers occasionally cut from Ficus
naphalocarpa, a tree sometimes planted to provide shade or as
 wind break near houses. The general perception amongst our
espondents in these four communities was that the food supply for
he small ruminants in the dry season was not a problem. A farmer
rom Dakyiae typiﬁed this viewpoint when he observed: Even in the
ry season, at that time goats improve, better than during this time
the cropping season] when they become lean because of tethering. It
s common knowledge amongst the smallholders and traders alike
hat small ruminants gain weight during the dry season in northern
hana.
A few of the smallholders provided water during the dry season
or their animals. The animals return to the house in the evenings
here they drink and then lie around the compound house during
ight-time. These farmers employed the provision of water as a
trategy that enabled them to monitor herd numbers during the
ry season. As one smallholder explained: We  provide water so that
hen one [animal] is not there we will know. Many of those who
id not provide water complained about the loss of animals, which
ent to the river or a dam site to drink and then got stolen or preyed
pon by stray dogs.
.5. Market-related off-take
Most smallholders in the study communities sold their animals
irectly at the main markets without going via middlemen. The
arket centres were close-by and could be reached by most of the
armers by bicycle or motor vehicles. The smallholders claimed that
hey received competitive prices at the market because of their
irect access to the traders. The average market-related off-take
cross the ﬁve communities was low: 10.5%. Table 5 compares the
ouseholds in the ﬁve communities in terms of the pattern of off-
ake of small ruminants in 2009.
Two motivations for selling small ruminants were recorded. The
rst was distress sales that occur mostly in the lean season, i.e.,
une–August after the planting of new ﬁelds but before harvest. Dis-
ress sales ﬂood the market and consequently the prices are low. As farmer observed despondently: Everybody is selling so the price is
ow. Some even have to return with their animals to the house because
hey are not sold at Babile market. A butcher concurred, saying When
upply is high in the market, demand is low and the bargaining price23 10 30.3
starts low. Hence traders pay a low price. The remuneration was  used
primarily to buy food. The second motivation was demand-driven
sales, i.e., the household sold animals in order to take advantage of
high market demand on occasions such as Christmas, Easter or the
Ramadan festival. The proceeds from demand-driven sales were
used for purchasing zinc rooﬁng sheets or cement for house con-
struction, or to cover the expenses incurred during the festivities.
The type of sale thus had two  dimensions: the period of sale and
the utilization of the income from the sale. From Table 5 it can
be seen that households that engaged in distress sales in all the
ﬁve communities in 2009 were twice the number of those making
demand-driven sales.
However, Table 5 also reveals that there were two commu-
nities where demand-driven sales were relatively high: Dakyiae
and Tankyara. In Dakyiae more households were able to produce
enough food as a result of an input credit scheme for one acre of
maize, provided by ADRA, an NGO. In Tankyara, the co-operative
society buys food during the harvesting period from its members
and resells this to anyone in the community when needed, with
only a modest price mark-up and so the community members are
not compelled to sell animals under distress. In the other three
communities, on the other hand, about half of the households
interviewed had been compelled to sell animals to buy food. For
instance, at Oribili in 2009, ﬁve out of the ten households inter-
viewed bought food and in 2010, four out of the nine households
interviewed bought food (compared with the one out of the eleven
household heads interviewed at Tankyara who  reported that he had
bought food in 2010).
3.6. Technical and labour organizational limitations
The limitations experienced in small ruminant production that
subsequently were ranked by farmer groups in each of the ﬁve
communities, are shown in Table 6.
The ﬁrst ranked in three out of the ﬁve communities was water
shortages during the dry season. The two  communities that chose
livestock mortality as the ﬁrst limitation were located near dams
that had been constructed in the 1990s through an IFAD-funded
project. The limitation ranked second by respondents in three out
of the ﬁve communities was  high mortality. A subsequent inter-
view in two  of these communities (Oribili and Tangasie, i.e., an ARI
community and non-ARI community, respectively) conﬁrmed that
mortality rates were high in 2010: 63% amongst kids (less than 1
year); 59% amongst lambs (less than 1 year); 47% amongst goats
(over 1 year); and 12% amongst sheep (over 1 year). In these com-
munities only a few farmers (i.e., 3 at Oribili and 6 at Tangasie)
recorded less than 10% mortality, probably as a result of their
special feeding and health care interventions. These rates can be
contrasted to the 0.88% and 1.98% for lamb and adult mortality,
respectively, that were recorded at the MoFA’s Ejura Sheep Breed-
ing Station in the same year. The limitation ranked third is livestock
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Table  6
Ranking of constraints in the small ruminant system in ﬁve communities in Lawra and Nadowli Districts.
Community Ranked 1st Ranked 2nd Ranked 3rd
Oribili Lack of water during dry season Diseases, mortality and high cost of
treatment
Lack of tractor services
Nandom Tankyara Water shortage during dry season Diseases, mortality and unavailable
veterinary extension
Lack of shepherding
Dakyiae Diseases, mortality and lack of
veterinary extension
Theft Lack of water in dry season
Kumasal Diseases, mortality and lack of
veterinary extension
Water shortage during dry season Kid mortality caused by free-range pigs
Tangasie Water shortage during dry season Diseases, mortality and lack of
veterinary extension
Theft
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heft. Livestock theft is prevalent especially at Tangasie. Only one
armer, whose house was located on the outskirts of Tangasie town,
ad succeeded in employing a number of trained dogs to prevent
he stealing of his animals.
An analysis of the institutional reasons behind the by farmers
rioritized constraints is given in Table 7 and Fig. 1. The institutional
nderpinnings mainly relate to contextual factors at the local level,
r conditions in the higher level institutional regime, that have hin-
ered a transition towards niche developments of a more proﬁtable
mall ruminant livestock system. Table 7 provides a summary of the
ausal analysis of the three top-ranked limitations that was under-
aken by sub-groups of stakeholders at the workshops in Lawra and
adowli Districts.
Fig. 1 is a synthesis of the causal analysis output of the two  sub-
roups that worked on the high mortality of small ruminants at the
awra and Nadowli workshops. It was selected for presentation in
his papers because it reveals all the three types of structural and
nstitutional underpinnings that were identiﬁed in the causal anal-
sis exercise: (1) a structural limitation in the availability of arable
ands; (2) weak support systems for animal production and health
ervices delivery; and (3) communities’ values, that are skewed
owards crop production more than animal husbandry.
The ﬁrst two were made visible for the ﬁrst time when the farm-
rs who often crossed the border to Burkina Faso to engage in family
nd business transactions contrasted in our interviews their own
nimal production system with that in Burkina Faso (which shares
 border with Ghana). One farmer summarized the differences as
ollows: Land is available in Burkina Faso. They always locate a large
lace for livestock grazing. We  can’t do that – we  need a place to
arm. Theft is here in Ghana. There people don’t steal. In Burkina Faso,
he government has constructed dams that make the place wet and
uitable for the growth of grasses at all times.
Another farmer observed that there is more land in Burkina Faso
han here. There somebody will rent a place out for rearing animals;
ere it is not like that. There is much stealing of animals in the dry
eason here. In the dry season our only source of water is a bore hole.
The issue of limited arable land was a structural constraint that
rose partly from the high population density, which for Ghana as a
hole was 101.6 persons per square kilometre, compared with 59.4
n Burkina Faso [32]. Control of livestock theft was  related to the
ffectiveness of the state police. In Ghana the general perception
as that there was an undue delay in administering justice when
heft cases were reported to the police. For instance, in early 2010,
2 cattle were stolen from a farmer at Tangasie and loaded onto a
ruck, but in the process of transportation the lorry broke down and
he driver was arrested. At the time of writing this paper (August
011), the theft case was still pending at the police station. The
raditional authorities also appeared incapable of addressing live-
tock theft, due to kinship relations. The Regent (or substitute chief)
t Tangasie narrated his personal experience as follows: Recently,.
some of the [ﬁve] goats that were stolen were mine. When some inhab-
itants apprehended the thieves, I took back my  [two] animals and left
the boys [the two thieves] on their own. Now that I am a Regent if I take
any action [against the boys] they [the community] will blame me.  I
have said that anybody who catches a thief should not bring the case
to me. In every community there is a taboo. Where the taboo system
does not work, that is when you have a theft problem. . ..  . ..  It was
Balu’s cattle that were stolen, and every month he goes to the police to
complain (Tangasie, 12.04.201).
The Burkina Faso police appeared to be more responsive in
addressing the social problem of theft. For instance, in early May
2011, livestock traders from the Lawra District were attacked by
armed robbers when the traders were attending a weekly mar-
ket in Burkina Faso. Since then the Burkina Faso authorities have
deployed the police to patrol the roads on their side of the border
during market days but no similar action has been taken in Ghana.
There also is weak support for animal production and health
services delivery in Ghana. As an informant at Tankyara said: We
don’t get veterinary people to come and vaccinate. At present there
are about three veterinary personnel in the whole district. They are
not monitored to ensure that they deliver animal health services. A
farmer at Kumasal observed: No regular vaccination is done since the
retirement of the last veterinary ofﬁcer, Mr. Sampa. Now no one comes
here. When there were many veterinary ofﬁcers here, our animals
don’t die.  Comments such as these were repeated during the institu-
tional analysis workshop. The participants’ analysis indicated that
since the decentralization of MoFA services in 1998, the control of
resources for the delivery of animal production and health services
has been shifted from the district animal production and veterinary
ofﬁcers to the district director. The consequences include a reduc-
tion in the supervision of veterinary ﬁeld staff and a lowering in
the coverage and quality of their services to smallholder farming
communities.
Routine vaccination against Peste Des Petits Ruminants (PPRs)
that could contribute to the control of small ruminant mortality
is hampered by the ineffective organization of the veterinary ser-
vices. For example, during the 2011 cropping season (June–August)
when the animals were tethered and therefore most farmers could
assemble their small ruminants for vaccination, there was  no vac-
cine available for PPR in Ghana. The stock of PPR vaccines expired in
June 2011 and apparently no provision was made by the Veterinary
Services Directorate of MoFA for restocking. Recently, a national
newspaper, the Daily Graphic of 19 August 2011 [33], reported that
imported PPR vaccines, worth thousands of euros, had expired in
August 2008 and 2009 and the MoFA was  summoned to explain
the circumstances to a Parliamentary Commission. Meanwhile,
the farmers interviewed in this study indicated that the over 50%
mortality rate amongst their small ruminants in 2009 and 2010
resulted from pneumonia and diarrhoea (i.e., symptoms indicative
of the fact that PPR vaccination had not been carried out). Recently,
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Table  7
Techno-institutional system analysis of the small ruminant production and marketing system in two communities in Lawra and Nadowli Districts, 2009.
Constraint Underlying reason Type of institutional
constraint
Agreed action Responsibilities
1. Inadequate water during
dry season
Community is not putting
pressure on District
Assembly (DA) to fulﬁl its
responsibility for
community water (i.e., pay
5% of total project cost for
water infrastructure)
Capability failure,
infrastructural failure
Community to send
delegation to DA and
Member of Parliament
BonikuuSaaleh (opinion
leader, Zambo) Stephen
(District co-operative
ofﬁcer)
Ritual of annual bush
burning (destroys
environment)
Soft institutional failure Promote non-burning Gban (farmer, Oribili)
Kuubezuur (Tovuori)
Oppong (Police Services)
2.  High livestock mortality Routine of mass selling of
animals in lean season for
farm expenditure
Soft institutional failure Promote demand-driven
selling and saving proceeds
with a bank
Project ofﬁcer (Lawra Area
Rural Bank)
Practice of land allocation
skewed towards crop
cultivation than livestock
grazing
Soft institutional failure Cultivation of fodder crops
along boarders of crop
ﬁelds
Rashid (supervisor, MoFA)
3.  Inadequate tractor
services
Land inheritance leading to
scattered crop ﬁelds
Soft institutional failure Block or group ploughing:
farmers to organize as
group for tractor ploughing
Manuor (farmer, Oribili),
Faar (AEA, MoFA)
4.  Inadequate water during
dry season
Lack of community
initiative
Capability failure, soft
network failure
Strengthen community
organizing ability
Regent, Assemblyman, Unit
Committee
Party  politicians
interference that ignores
due procedures for
provision of community
water
Soft institutional failure Create awareness on
procedures for getting
funding from DA for
community water
DA sub-committee on
environment, NCCE
Non-enforcement of laws
on bush ﬁres
Hard institutional failure Enforce laws on bush ﬁres Police, Fire Service, Unit
Committee Traditional
authorities
5.  Livestock mortality Attitude of minimum
investment in animal
husbandry especially
housing and feeding
Soft institutional failure Form community livestock
committee to foster
attitudinal change
Isaac Dari (AEA, MoFA)
Weak structure for animal
production and health care
delivery
Hard institutional failure,
infrastructural failure,
weak network failure
Foster structural changes National CIG
6.  Theft Routine of free-ranging
and stray animals
Soft institutional failure Education on housing; ﬁeld
trips with farmers
Regent
Enforce bylaws on bush
ﬁres
Police, Fire Service,
Traditional authorities.
Co-ordination by: Regent &
Florence Dari
7.  Low body weight of local
breeds that fetch low
price
Weak structure of breeding
stations (except one)
engaged in small ruminant
breed improvement
programmes and outreach
to smallholders
Capability failure,
infrastructural failure,
weak network failure
Fostering structural
changes in breeding
stations to enhance breed
improvement programmes
and outreach to
smallholders
National CIG
8.  Inadequate slaughter
slaps in Accra and
Kumasi
Lack of co-ordination of
slaughtering activities by
authorities in the cities
Interaction failure Create platform for regular
interaction amongst
relevant city authorities
National CIG
9.  Payment of unofﬁcial
fees by livestock traders
at police barriers on
highways
Institutionalization of
bribery in Police Service
Soft institutional failure Foster interaction between
police and other supply
chain actors
National CIG
S
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otes:  Limitations ‘1.’ to ‘3.’ were discussed at the Lawra workshop. Participants we
articipants were 21 including 4 farmers; limitations ‘7.’ to ‘9.’ were mentioned by 
hree out of the six experimental goats purchased at Tangasie mar-
et in August 2011 for an on-farm experiment in this study died
ithin three weeks of acquisition, from pneumonia according to
he post-mortem report of the principal veterinary ofﬁcer for the
rea.
The third institutional underpinning of the constraints experi-
nced by farmers in the small ruminant production system relates
o community values and norms. The interviews indicated that all
he farmers in all ﬁve communities valued crop production more
han animal husbandry. For example, a farmer at Dakyiae kept twoncluding 8 farmers; limitations ‘4.’ to ‘6.’ were discussed at the Nadowli workshop.
actors in the supply chain.
bullocks for ploughing and 28 small ruminants (eight sheep and
20 goats). He said that every year he spent money on treatment
of only the cattle to prevent illness and ensure that they work hard.
However, he did not spend money on the health of the small rumi-
nants. Another farmer at Kumasal concurred with this view, saying
that Many people don’t pay to treat animals. They think that gov-
ernment subsidy should cater for animal treatment. They also reason
that humans get sick and go to hospital, so why should animals not
go to hospital. Another informant related the low value his commu-
nity placed on small ruminants (compared with crop production)
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o the difference in livestock production systems between Ghana
nd Burkina Faso. He observed that The difference between Ghana
nd Burkina Faso is cultural – this is our way of life – crop farming is
ur main occupation whereas livestock is an auxiliary activity. Many
f the farmers interviewed repeated the phrase that In Burkina Faso,
ivestock is their main activity.
The high value placed on crop production compared with animal
usbandry is reﬂected also in the low adoption of fodder technolo-
ies. From 2003 to 2009 ARI promoted the cultivation of Cajanus
ajan as fodder banks in two of the communities (i.e., Orbili and
ankyara) as part of a small ruminant improvement project. In the
rst year of the Cajanus experiment the project ploughed the ﬁelds
nd provided Cajanus seeds to selected farmers. The majority of
he beneﬁciary farmers did not plant the seeds; and out of those
ho planted the seeds, many failed to harvest the fodder [26]. On
he other hand, a number of farmers belonging to the Wala ethnic
roup (who trace their origin to the Fulanis in Mali who are noted
or cattle herding) have adopted Cajanus fodder bank cultivation
nder a project co-ordinated by MoFA during the same period.
. Discussion
.1. The interrelationship between technical and institutional
onstraints: going beyond optimizing markets
Our analysis indicates that constraints related to technical,
nfrastructural, institutional, interactional, and capability factors
re strongly co-related and serve to lock-in the current small rumi-
ant production system in Ghana to existing practices. Our analysis
uggests in addition that there is a clear relationship between the
onstraints experienced by small ruminant producers at the local
rganizational and institutional conditions and the higher-level
nes. Such a relationship has been reported also in other areas [3,9].
owever, Udo et al. [2],  van Rooyen and Homann-Kee Tui [3],  and
ocho et al. [5] highlight the need to change the higher level con-
traints in the sphere of market access before local level innovation
an occur. By applying the innovation systems failure framework
ur study was able to highlight that simultaneous investments are
eeded in related sectors, such as in improving the organization of
ater management, re-organizing veterinary service delivery, and
mproving law enforcement.
In our study the prioritized local level constraints were water
hortages, high livestock mortality and theft. The correspond-
ng institutional limitations include the weak interaction between
ommunity and district and national level organizations for water
rovision, the weak organizational structure for animal health
elivery, and weak traditional and formal delivery of justice. A num-
er of social mechanisms or processes link the local constraints to
he higher-level institutional settings. For example, with regard to
ater shortages during the dry season, community members have
ailed to organize contributions to provide their own  water supply,
r made demands as a collective interest on the district assembly
nd other politicians. In the case of animal health services deliv-
ry, the few farmers who could afford to pay for the services still
ere not getting any service because of inadequacies in the veteri-
ary technical service and because they did not have the clout to
dvocate or lobby the central government to lift the ban on employ-
ent of new veterinary ﬁeld staff. On the other hand, the available
eterinary technical ofﬁcers lamented that most farmers appear
nwilling to pay for services rendered. With regard to livestock
heft, the smallholder farmers who become victims have to make
epeated visits to the police station yet justice is not delivered.
We argue on the basis of our ﬁndings and analysis that what
eeds to change is the existing pattern of interaction, in the
roadest sense. Numerous small-ruminant system optimizational of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 37– 47 45
studies similarly suggest changes in relationships [3,5,9] at regime
level in order to relax lower level constraints but in recent years
they have tended to focus one-sidedly on market relationships. Our
study indicates a need for a more systemic change.
4.2. Understanding the rationale that holds small ruminant
production systems below the optimum
In the prevailing high-risk environment and the numerous con-
straints identiﬁed in this study, most smallholders seek to achieve
a livelihood from multiple sources and by means of low input-
sufﬁcient volume small ruminant production in order to meet their
needs whenever the occasion demands. Only a few individuals in
four out of the ﬁve communities (i.e., Orbili, Kumalsa, Tangasie,
Dakyiae), and the co-operative members in Tankyara community,
had developed successful strategies for improved small ruminant
husbandry that enabled them to take advantage of the periods of
high market demand. For the majority of the smallholders higher
input, market-oriented is not seen as a viable option.
Consequently, the investment of smallholders’ resources in
terms of capital and labour is skewed towards crop production
rather than livestock rearing. Yet crop production is apparently
co-dependent on the income from small ruminants. This ﬁnding is
consistent with an earlier observation made by the Animal Research
Institute of Ghana that smallholders in the Lawra area are guided
by the principle of minimum investment in livestock but optimum
investment in crop production [4]. The minimum investment prin-
ciple is also consistent with the numerous studies that indicate that
the production decisions of farmers in semi-arid Sub-Saharan Africa
are strongly based on risk avoidance rather than maximization of
returns [3,34,35]. The keeping of large numbers of livestock is an
insurance against climatic risks and uncertainties. In the study area
the average numbers of small ruminants kept by one person is small
but this totals to a higher number at community levels. The skewed
investment in crop production as against animal husbandry also is
related to the communities’ own perceptions of their identity as
crop farmers. The relationship between self-image and livelihood
strategies has been found also elsewhere [36].
A strategy of risk avoidance rather than return maximization,
when coupled to a normative rule that values crop production
above animal husbandry, poses a challenge to those desirous of
stimulating market-driven production of small ruminants in the
study communities. It also brings into question the contemporary
push towards market integration of smallholders into value chains,
seemingly irrespective of socio-cultural and other contextual fac-
tors [3,37].  Recent research indicates that there almost always exist
several viable pathways for developing a farming system, even
under homogeneous conditions [38,39].
4.3. Capitalizing upon diversity and ‘positive deviants’
The assertion that there is a low probability that market produc-
tion of small ruminants might emerge spontaneously is consistent
with innovation systems studies that indicate that niche develop-
ments by smallholders and other actors are unlikely unless there
are changes in the institutional arrangements in the broader envi-
ronment in which smallholders and their production systems are
embedded [3,9,16]. On the other hand, our study suggests that local
actors in these conditions indeed may  produce novelties, such as
the practice of supplementary feeding and non-burning of bush at
Tankyara, the Leucaena used as live fencing by a farmer at Tangasie,
the half an acre of Stylosanthes pasture introduced by a farmer at
Oribili, the low small ruminant mortality achieved by a few farmers
at Oribili and Tangasie, as well as the demand-driven sales of small
ruminants by a few of the households at Tankyara and Dakyiae.
Tankyara stands out in a number of ways in this list of novelties. The
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doption of supplementary feeding by the co-operative members
ndicates that the principle of minimum investment in livestock can
e relaxed. The community itself attributes this to the organizing
ole of their co-operative society. However, they also acknowl-
dge that they continue to experience water shortages and high
ivestock mortality at levels comparable with the other communi-
ies. The participants in the stakeholder workshop indicated that
he institutional reasons underlying the persistence of such con-
traints are positioned at levels higher than the community level.
o summarize, the Tankyara case illustrates that there is a role for
ommunity-level social arrangements in addressing certain insti-
utional constraints but also indicates that institutional limitations
nter-acting at multiple levels of social organization can lock the
mall ruminant system into low performance.
There are two important implications to be derived from our
bservation of farmers who act as positive deviants [10] and who
nnovate ‘below the radar’ [40]. One implication is that the study
f how positive deviants succeed in introducing change and of
he strategies they employ to change relationships in their envi-
onment in favour of the realization of their innovative practices,
ould be the basis of interventions that might prove effective for
any other farmers. Understanding how they durably embed their
ovelties in social arrangements (following [11] and [14]) to over-
ome the institutional constraints to which also the other farmers
re exposed, might open up new starting points for development.
he other implication is that intervention strategies need to go
eyond the farm level. A number of recent studies make the case for
nnovation platforms (called ‘innovation and concertation groups’
r CIGs in the COS–SIS programme) to foster the emergence of
ovelties and associated changes in mainstream practices so as
o open up niches for transformational change [3,9], and to relax
onstraints embedded in institutional regimes [16,35]. The rele-
ance of our ﬁndings to the innovation platform concept is that
IG stakeholders should allow for diversity in development path-
ays (following [41]), and not be too strongly inﬂuenced by a
re-analytic preference for market-based solutions and technology
ackages delivered by research organizations.
.4. Reﬂections on the methodology
The main research question posed in this study focused on the
nstitutions that hinder innovation and the market participation
f smallholder small ruminant producers. In the course of writing
he paper it became evident that an equally important question
elates to what the smallholders themselves might do to address
he constraints and the implications their problem-solving strate-
ies might have for interventions by development organizations
nd services. In retrospect, an asset-based approach like a positive
eviants enquiry [42] might have offered additional insight.
Another issue is that one of the six communities initially selected
or the study was not included because of time constraints. How-
ver, this is unlikely to have affected the results because the
xplorative and interpretivist case study design [22] seeks to under-
tand the diversity of the perspectives of the actors rather than to
eneralize the results of a statistical study to a broader population.
An additional source of bias is that only six out of the 53 farm-
rs interviewed in the ﬁve communities were women. Tradition
emands that the household head or the landlord receives visi-
ors and communicates their mission and deliberations to the rest
f the household and the assets of wives and children belong to
he household head or landlord. When our male respondents were
sked about who the real owners of the sheep and goats were,
any seemed to think the question was irrelevant or they became
rritated. The exploration of small ruminant production in future
esearch would need to include more women respondents and
[al of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 37– 47
should entail study of the gendered nature of the social organization
of small ruminant ownership.
5. Conclusions
This study shows that crop production is co-dependent on small
ruminant production and marketing. The main constraints expe-
rienced by the smallholders are water shortages during the dry
season, high ruminant mortality rates, and the theft of small rumi-
nants. The constraints persist because of institutional and structural
factors interacting at a range of levels and they block further devel-
opments of the majority of the smallholders. The study indicates
that in the harsh conditions in which they live the smallholders seek
resilience through diversifying their sources of livelihood, by low-
input investment in small ruminant production, and by keeping
their animals as a capital stock and insurance. However, a few pos-
itive deviants have developed novel practices that enable them to
overcome some of the constraints and to engage in market-oriented
production of small ruminants. These novelties could provide the
basis for diverse development pathways that open up a range of
possibilities beyond purely market-led or purely technology-led
change.
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